Copyright (c) 2000
First Things 105 (August/September 2000): 46-51.
Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny. By Robert Wright. Pantheon.
436 pp. $27.50.
Reviewed by William A. Dembski
In Nonzero Robert Wright argues convincingly that certain patterns in
biological and cultural evolution cannot properly be attributed to contingency
or accident but rather point to an underlying teleology—for him, a fully
naturalized teleology. Most teleologies of the past have looked to some entity
or principle beyond the strictly material and physical. Bossuet’s universal
history guided by providence, Hegel’s phenomenology of spirit, Bergson’s élan
vital, and Teilhard de Chardin’s omega point —all invoked quasi–mystical
elements. Wright wants none of this. Instead, he wants a teleology acceptable
to the most hard–core of scientific materialists.
Wright’s naturalized teleology unites two theories: Darwinism and game
theory, the latter a mathematical theory widely employed in the social sciences
(especially economics). Wright is neither a biologist nor a mathematician, and
he never ex plains or justifies these theories, being content to presuppose
them and apply them as broadly as possible.
Wright’s naturalized teleology works as follows. Organisms, whether evolving
biologically or culturally, face pressures that can hinder them from leaving
offspring. For biological evolution the offspring are genes; for cultural
evolution they are “memes” (this coinage by Richard Dawkins denotes a basic
unit of cultural information, e.g., a religious doctrine). The essential
characteristic of organisms is reproduction, and what they reproduce are genes
(through biological reproduction) or memes (through cultural dissemination).
Genes and memes, according to Wright, constitute an organism’s enduring
heritage.
Now the question most on Wright’s mind is how specific genes and memes
emerge, become prominent, and ultimately dominate a gene or meme pool. For
Wright the answer always devolves to the interplay between Darwinian natural
selection, zero–sum games, and non–zero–sum games. According to Wright there is
a well–defined logic to this interplay. Initially there’s a zero–sum game, that
is, an interaction between organisms where one’s loss is another’s gain.
Zero–sum games place enormous stress on an organism and lead it to seek support
from fellow organisms that are, as Wright puts it, “in the same boat.”
Organisms in the same boat, facing common external pressure, do best by
rowing in sync—in other words, by cooperating. In the language of game theory,
they now need to play a non–zero–sum game where what benefits one benefits
others. Those non–zero–sum solutions that best benefit the group will then be
selected since they lead to the survival and flourishing of the group. Such
solutions include novel biological structures and technological innovation.
Accor ding to Wright this is how novel genes and memes are generated.
Let us call this interplay between Darwinian selection, zero–sum games, and
non–zero–sum games Wright’s “nonzero dynamic.” According to Wright, the nonzero
dynamic confers a direction on biological and cultural evolution by leading to
increased complexity over time—the teleology in Wright’s scheme.
To see how complexity emerges from Wright’s nonzero dynamic, consider his
favorite metaphor to describe the nonzero dynamic: an “arms race.” An arms race
is a zero–sum game between two (or more) nations that leads to a non–zero–sum
game within a nation as it desperately seeks to produce the most effective
countermeasures against its common enemy. For Wright all biological and
cultural progress consists in innovating successful countermeasures according
to the nonzero dynamic.
Let’s look at one example of this dynamism at work in biology. Bombardier
beetles squirt a hot noxious fluid at predators, a trick that evolved under
pressure from predators who would otherwise devour them. But what about the
predators who can now no longer devour these beetles and whose livelihood is
now in jeopardy? In some cases they evolved novel behaviors for causing the
beetle to discharge its fluid harmlessly and thus render it vulnerable. The
next round in the arms race may feature an adaptation that improves the
beetle’s hot–noxious–fluid delivery system.
This example concerns biological evolution, but according to Wright his
nonzero dynamic applies equally well to cultural evolution. Everything from
political systems to religious ideas to technological advances is explained by
the nonzero dynamic. One political system gives way to another because it
cannot handle new challenges. One religion gives way to another because it can
no longer make sense of the world. One technology gives way to another because
it can no longer keep pace with our needs. According to Wright, the nonzero
dynamic drives innovation and thereby continually enriches and regenerates the
world.
Wright sees the nonzero dynamic as a positive force in history. In
purchasing increased complexity over time, biological and cultural evolution
also purchases increasingly complex networks of what Wright calls
“non–zero–sumness.” (For Wright this word, more than any other, captures what
his book is about—he even wanted to make it the title, though prudence, and
editors with an ear for the English language, ultimately dissuaded him.)
Complex innovations require complex organizational structures to produce them.
Thus, according to Wright, the nonzero dynamic leads inexorably to increasingly
larger webs of interconnectedness, of which the World Wide Web is currently our
most notable example. Moreover, once a web of interconnectedness playing a
non–zero–sum game becomes global, some degree of universal cooperation is
achieved.
But Wright is not a utopian. Although the push of the nonzero dynamic is
toward increased cooperation, historical contingency can always derail
non–zero–sumness in any given instance. The nonzero dynamic is probabilistic
and statistical; it says where history as a whole is heading without
guaranteeing where any item of history may end up. According to Wright, humans
may well destroy themselves in a nuclear holocaust. But if so, a new species
will take its place, one that attains our level of intelligence but is more
adept at enabling universal non–zero–sumness to prevail. The message of
Wright’s book is, to paraphrase John Lennon, “give non–zero–sumness a chance.”
Here, then, is Wright’s grand vision. What can be said about it by way of
criticism? Perhaps the most well–known criticism comes from Stephen Jay Gould,
who in works that predate Wright’s argues that biological and cultural
evolution is thoroughly contingent—that if the tape of history were replayed,
not only would we not be here, but nothing like us would be here. Nonetheless,
the pattern of convergence in biological and cultural evolution seriously
undermines Gould’s contingency claim. The same sorts of biological structures
and cultural artifacts keep being reinvented. Eyes have been reinvented dozens
of times in the course of evolutionary history. And how many times has the
wheel been invented in human history?
A different line of criticism begins with what philosopher David Lewis calls
an “incredulous stare.” Whatever the arguments pro or con, it is simply too
much to believe that the nonzero dynamic can explain the totality of biological
and cultural evolution. Wright’s nonzero dynamic is a universal problem–solver
that purports to explain everything and thus explains too much. The skeptic in
us shies away from such universal problem–solvers.
Even so, an incredulous stare is not an argument. What specifically is wrong
with Wright’s nonzero dynamic? In a recent debate at Baylor University between
Wright and professional skeptic Michael Shermer, Shermer tried to run through
some examples from biological and cultural evolution where the nonzero dynamic
failed. The problem is that the nonzero dynamic is incredibly plastic. Indeed,
by being fundamentally probabilistic, it is able to accommodate apparent
exceptions by dismissing them as failed experiments that do nothing to
undermine the ultimate success of non–zero–sumness.
Although there is a flaw in the nonzero dynamic, it can’t be shown through
historical counterexamples. The subtitle of Wright’s book is, after all, “The
Logic of Human Destiny,” and it is here that the weakness in his argument
appears—though perhaps the problem is not so much logical error as oversight.
Wright is on to something with his nonzero dynamic, but it is not the complete
explanation of natural and historical development he takes it to be. Wright
argues that the nonzero dynamic is sufficient to account for biological and
cultural innovation. I would argue that it forms a necessary backdrop for
biological and cultural innovation, but that besides Darwinian natural
selection and game theory a tertium quid is required—namely, intelligence.
The indispensability of this tertium quid becomes evident when we compare
Wright’s treatment of cultural evolution to his treatment of biological
evolution. Although the nonzero dynamic is supposed to assimilate both to a
common framework, Wright’s treatment of the two is actually quite different.
Over and over we read that a non–zero–sum situation leads to some cultural
innovation because it was a “good idea.” But good ideas only come from
idea–makers, namely, intelligent agents. Non zero dynamics set the stage for
innovations to occur, but they are not sufficient. A telephone may be a good
idea given a certain stage in cultural evolution, but it still takes an
Alexander Graham Bell to invent it. This is obvious for cultural changes, but
Wright overlooks the fact that biological innovations also require intelligent
agents to actualize the conditions made possible by the nonzero dynamic. A
bacterial flagellum may be a good idea for propelling bacteria through watery
environments, but who or what is the designer of such bi–directional outboard
rotary motors?
Wright would have us believe that any addition of intelligent agency to his
nonzero dynamic is superfluous. For Wright, natural selection is an incredibly
creative force that produced the very human intellects that in turn guide
cultural evolution. The “good ideas” needed to make biological and cultural evolution
work are, for Wright, ultimately explained by natural selection. If natural
selection is not the creative force that he makes out, though, then Wright’s
argument is in trouble. He assumes without argument the strongest claims on
behalf of Darwinism and from there develops his nonzero dynamic. But the
capacity of the Darwinian mechanism to generate complex, information–rich
biological structures is increasingly coming under fire, and not just from
members of the burgeoning intelligent design movement. Complex
self–organization, as developed by the Santa Fe Institute, a scientific think
tank, is also challenging the completeness of Darwinian natural selection as a
mechanism for generating biological innovation. Complex systems, according to
the Santa Fe paradigm, can emerge from purely physical properties of an
underlying physical substrate—e.g., hexagonal frost patterns emerge
spontaneously by water condensing on a cold window pane.
To sum up, this is an intelligent and well–written book that should be read
by anyone interested in whether history has a direction. It is an ambitious
book, and somewhat predictably tries to do too much, assimilating the grand
sweep of history to an ultimately inadequate framework. In particular, by
placing inordinate weight on natural selection, Wright fails to address
adequately the challenge posed by intelligent agency. Indeed, it is becoming
increasingly implausible that all the good ideas in history ultimately derive
from natural selection—non–zero–sumness notwithstanding.
William A. Dembski is a fellow of the Center for the Renewal of Science and
Culture at the Seattle–based Discovery Institute. His latest book is Intelligent
Design: The Bridge Between Science and Theology.